

DIST:- DIRECTOR DD AD(C) QAR

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REQUEST FOR AUSTRALIAN SIGINT SUPPORT IN BORNEO  
MEMORANDUM BY DIRECTOR DSD IN CONJUNCTION WITH DIRECTORS OF  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND SIGNALS.

I. NEED FOR IMPROVED SIGINT COVERAGE.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE NEED FOR IMPROVED INTELLIGENCE ON THE  
EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL THREATS TO MALAYSIA, THE AUSTRALIAN AND  
BRITISH SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT) AUTHORITIES HAVE RECENTLY  
REVIEWED THE ADEQUACY OF THE RESOURCES JOINTLY DEPLOYED AGAINST  
SIGINT TARGETS CAPABLE OF PROVIDING INFORMATION WHICH MIGHT ASSIST,  
IN PARTICULAR, IN THE DEFENCE OF THE BORNEO STATES. THIS REVIEW  
HAS ESTABLISHED THAT

(A) ALTHOUGH BRITISH ARMY SIGINT INTERCEPTION UNITS NOW OPERATING  
IN LABUAN AND KUCHING ARE PROVIDING VALUABLE INFORMATION, THEIR  
CAPACITY HAS BEEN OVERTAKEN BY THE GROWTH OF INDONESIAN  
COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS IN BORNEO, AND THERE IS AN INCREASING  
VOLUME OF MATERIAL OF HIGH INTELLIGENCE POTENTIAL WHICH CANNOT BE  
COLLECTED. THIS DEFICIENCY WILL BECOME MORE ACUTE AS THE  
INDONESIANS ESTABLISH RADIO LINKS WITH DETACHMENTS INSIDE MALAYSIAN  
TERRITORY AND IMPLEMENT THE PLANNED REINFORCEMENT OF KALIMANTAN.  
EXPLOITATION OF THESE COMMUNICATIONS SHOULD PROVIDE  
ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE OF POSSIBLY CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO THE  
SUCCESS OF SECURITY FORCE OPERATIONS, INCLUDING DETAILS OF:-

- (I) MOVEMENTS AND LOCATIONS OF TNI AND +VOLUNTEER+ ELEMENTS.
- (II) RESUPPLY.
- (III) SAFE AREAS, TARGETS, AND SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES.

(IV) MILITARY ACTIVITIES.

(V) INDONESIAN REPORTS OF MALAYSIAN, BRITISH AND AUSTRALIAN  
ACTIVITIES IN BORNEO,

(B) THIS DEFICIENCY CANNOT BE MET BY INCREASED COLLECTION AT  
OTHER INTERCEPT SITES- WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS, THE REQUIRED TRANS-

(B) THIS DEFICIENCY CANNOT BE MET BY INCREASED COLLECTION AT OTHER INTERCEPT SITES- WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS, THE REQUIRED TRANSMISSIONS WILL BE AUDIBLE ONLY WITHIN BORNEO.

(C) THERE IS A GROWING NEED FOR IMPROVED TIMELINESS IN THE PRODUCTION OF SIGINT FROM MATERIAL ALREADY INTERCEPTED IN BORNEO, AND FOR MORE RAPID DISSEMINATION TO SECURITY FORCE COMMANDERS IN THE FIELD. DELAYS ARE IMPOSED BY LACK OF:

(I) EXCLUSIVE HIGH-CAPACITY SIGNAL LINKS BETWEEN THE MAIN SIGINT STATION IN SINGAPORE AND THE BORNEO SITES-

(II) EXPERT ANALYSIS AND REPORTING STAFFS AT THE BORNEO STATIONS.

(D) BY REDEPLOYMENT FROM ~~THE AUSTRALIAN SERVICES~~ AND GERMANY, THE BRITISH ARMY CAN PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INTERCEPTION OPERATORS AND CERTAIN SUPPORTING STAFF REQUIRED IN BORNEO. HOWEVER, THE BRITISH SERVICES HAVE HAD LITTLE EXPERIENCE IN THE INTERCEPTION AND ANALYSIS OF INDONESIAN COMMUNICATIONS, AND HAVE NO PERSONNEL WITH THE SKILLS REQUIRED TO COPE EFFECTIVELY WITH THE MORE COMPLEX ASPECTS. ~~THE AUSTRALIAN SERVICES HAVE HAD EXTENSIVE~~ EXPERIENCE AND HAVE BECOME HIGHLY PROFICIENT IN THIS WORK- IN PARTICULAR, THE A.M.F., THROUGH ITS LONG INVOLVEMENT IN COMPARABLE WORK AT THE SINGAPORE STATION, HAS SPECIAL COMPETENCE IN THE TASKS CURRENTLY INVOLVED IN BORNEO.

(E) THE SINGAPORE STATION IS ALREADY FULLY COMMITTED

ANY DEPLOYMENT OF AMF FROM THAT STATION TO BORNEO WOULD LEAVE VERY SERIOUS GAPS, AND THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY

(F) REQUIREMENTS IN BORNEO CALL FOR THE PROVISION OF A SELF-CONTAINED UNIT WITH INTERCEPTION, ANALYSIS, REPORTING, COMMUNICATIONS AND SUPPORTING CAPABILITIES, SO ORGANIZED THAT IT CAN OPERATE AT TWO MAIN STATIC SITES AND CONDUCT LIMITED FIELD RECONNAISSANCE. INITIALLY, A STRENGTH OF APPROXIMATELY 50 ALL RANKS IS NEEDED, BUILDING UP TO APPROXIMATELY 63 AS TARGET OPPORTUNITIES AND OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS DEVELOP.

11. MEANS PROPOSED TO MEET BORNEO REQUIREMENT.

2. THE REQUIREMENT OUTLINED ABOVE CAN - IN PRACTICE - BE MET ONLY BY THE DEPLOYMENT IN BORNEO OF BOTH AUSTRALIAN AND ADDITIONAL BRITISH RESOURCES, AND BY BRITISH REINFORCEMENT OF SINGAPORE TO REPLACE AUSTRALIANS TRANSFERRED TO BORNEO. THE MEANS BY WHICH THIS MIGHT BE ACHIEVED HAVE BEEN AGREED INFORMALLY BETWEEN THE AUSTRALIAN AND BRITISH ORGANISATIONS, AND ARE SET OUT IN THE ATTACHED REQUEST WHICH HAS NOW BEEN FORMALLY SUBMITTED BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE (BRITISH) GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS HEADQUARTERS. IN BRIEF, IT IS PROPOSED THAT:-

(I) ADDITIONAL BRITISH ARMY RESOURCES SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO BORNEO FROM GERMANY, TO REINFORCE THE EXISTING



(II) ADDITIONAL BRITISH CIVILIAN RESOURCES SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO SINGAPORE FROM EUROPE.

(III) THE AMF UNIT (201 SQUADRON) NOW INTEGRATED INTO THE SINGAPORE STATION SHOULD ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF SIGINT IN BORNEO, AND SHOULD PROVIDE SPECIALIST AND SUPPORTING STAFF, EQUIPMENT, AND SERVICES NOT AVAILABLE FROM BRITISH RESOURCES. THE COMBINED RESOURCES WOULD THUS OPERATE ON AN INTEGRATED BASIS UNDER AMF DIRECTION.

3. FINAL DETAILS OF THE PROPOSED RESPECTIVE MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT CONTRIBUTIONS HAVE YET TO BE AGREED. IN OUTLINE, HOWEVER, THE EXISTING BRITISH UNIT (                      IN BORNEO, WHICH NOW TOTALS 16 MEMBERS, WOULD BE REINFORCED AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE BY BOTH BRITISH AND AUSTRALIAN RESOURCES TO A TOTAL OF APPROXIMATELY 50 ALL RANKS, OF WHOM ABOUT 28 WOULD BE AMF. FURTHER REINFORCEMENT, AS NECESSARY, (SEE 1(F) ABOVE) WOULD BRING THE TOTAL STRENGTH TO ABOUT 63, OF WHOM 32 WOULD BE AUSTRALIAN. THE AMF WOULD MEET THE EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS OF ITS OWN PERSONNEL AND OF COMMON SERVICES (E.G. COMMUNICATIONS) FOR THE UNIT AS A WHOLE. OTHER CHARGES (E.G. FOR WORKS SERVICES) WOULD BE APPORTIONED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES.

4. TO PERMIT THE AMF STRENGTH IN BORNEO TO BE SUSTAINED BY ROTATION FROM SINGAPORE, AN ADDITIONAL 11 MEMBERS OF THE PARENT MAINLAND UNIT (101 WIRELESS REGIMENT) WOULD NEED TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM AUSTRALIA TO SINGAPORE/BORNEO. THIS DETACHMENT COULD BE MADE WITHOUT SERIOUS DETRIMENT TO THE TASKS UNDERTAKEN AT THE MAINLAND STATION.

5. THE PROPOSED REDEPLOYMENT OF BRITISH RESOURCES WOULD ENTAIL -

(A) IN BORNEO/SINGAPORE, REINFORCEMENT BY APPROXIMATELY -

(I) 8 BRITISH ARMY MEMBERS DRAWN FROM EUROPE (OF WHOM 3 ARE ALREADY UNDER TRAINING IN SINGAPORE).

(II) 12 BRITISH ARMY MEMBERS WITHDRAWN

(B) IN SINGAPORE, REINFORCEMENT BY APPROXIMATELY 20 CIVILIANS FROM THE U.K.

6.

III. EFFECT ON AUSTRALIAN SIGINT CAPABILITY.

7. CONTINGENCY PLANS RELATED TO SEATO WAR PLANNING NOMINATE

#### ACCEPTANCE OF

THE COMMITMENT NOW PROPOSED IN BORNEO WOULD SERIOUSLY LIMIT THE ABILITY OF THE AMF TO MEET A SEATO SITUATION. UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS IT IS CONSIDERED THAT BORNEO SHOULD HAVE PRIORITY OVER ANY PROSPECTIVE SEATO REQUIREMENT.

8. DEPLOYMENT TO BORNEO WOULD NOT, IN ITSELF, SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT AMF ABILITY TO MEET PROSPECTIVE REQUIREMENTS

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#### IV. ROLE OF PROPOSED BORNEO UNIT.

9. IN OUTLINE, THE ROLE WOULD BE:-

- (A) TO CONDUCT INTERCEPT, PROCESSING AND REPORTING TASKS ASSIGNED BY DSD TO MEET THE NEEDS OF BOTH FIELD AND NATIONAL-LEVEL SIGINT CONSUMERS.
- (B) AS AGREED FROM TIME TO TIME BETWEEN DSD AND THE AUSTRALIAN AND BRITISH ARMY AUTHORITIES CONCERNED, TO EXERCISE FULL LOCAL CONTROL OVER A NOMINATED PROPORTION OF THE UNIT'S RESOURCES FOR THE PRIME PURPOSE OF PROVIDING IMMEDIATE SIGINT SUPPORT TO SECURITY FORCE COMMANDERS IN THE FIELD.

#### V. SECURITY.

10. PROTECTION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING THE MISSION AND OBJECTIVES OF THE UNIT IS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE.

MINIMAL RISKS MUST HOWEVER BE ACCEPTED IN BORNEO, AS ELSEWHERE, IF IMPORTANT OPERATIONAL NEEDS ARE TO BE MET.

11. THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION TO AND EMPLOYMENT IN BORNEO OF A BODY OF 20-30 AUSTRALIAN SIGNALLERS IS NOT CONSIDERED TO BE PRACTICABLE. PRECAUTIONS WHICH IT IS HOWEVER CONSIDERED SHOULD BE TAKEN INCLUDE:-

- (A) THE DEPLOYMENT SHOULD BE GIVEN NO PUBLICITY. AT THE FIRST SUITABLE OPPORTUNITY, HOWEVER, SOME PUBLIC REFERENCE COULD BE MADE TO THE NEED TO STATION IN BORNEO CERTAIN AMF ELEMENTS SUPPORTING THE ENGINEER UNIT.
- (B) A COVER STORY SHOULD BE AGREED IN ADVANCE BY THE AUSTRALIAN AND BRITISH AUTHORITIES CONCERNED. THIS MIGHT BE ALONG THE LINES THAT AMF SIGNALLERS ARE ASSISTING BRITISH COMMUNICATIONS UNITS IN BORNEO TO MEET INCREASED MESSAGE LOADINGS RESULTING FROM THE PRESENCE OF AUSTRALIAN ENGINEERS IN BORNEO. NECESSARY INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN OR CONCERNED WITH THE MOVE.
- (C) THE MAIN MOVEMENT TO BORNEO SHOULD NOT BE MADE BEFORE THE ARRIVAL THERE OF THE AMF ENGINEER UNIT. A SMALL NUMBER OF AMF SPECIALISTS (NOT EXCEEDING (SAY) 6 IN ALL) COULD HOWEVER BE ATTACHED TO THE EXISTING BRITISH PARTIES AT AN EARLY STAGE.
- (D) THE UNIT SHOULD NORMALLY OPERATE FROM PROTECTED SITES IN OR

ADJACENT TO ESTABLISHED HEADQUARTERS AT LABUAN AND KUCHING.  
DEPLOYMENT OF ANY PART OF THE AMF RESOURCES TO BORDER AREAS SHOULD  
NOT BE MADE WITHOUT PRIOR AGREEMENT OF THE AUSTRALIAN DEPARTMENT  
OF DEFENCE.

VI. TIMING.

12. THE NEED FOR REINFORCEMENT IS ALREADY URGENT, AND THE BRITISH  
AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN ASKED TO EXPEDITE THEIR ARRANGEMENTS. IN THE  
LIGHT OF 11(C) ABOVE, IT IS ENVISAGED THAT UP TO SIX AMF MEMBERS  
WILL BE DETACHED, PROBABLY TO LABUAN, UPON APPROVAL OF THESE  
PROPOSALS. A FURTHER MOVE, BRINGING THE DETACHED AMF STRENGTH TO  
ABOUT 28, WOULD BE MADE WITHIN A FEW DAYS OF THE ARRIVAL IN BORNEO  
OF THE ENGINEERS. BUILD UP TO THE EVENTUAL AMF TOTAL OF 32 WOULD  
FOLLOW, THEREAFTER, AS DICTATED BY OPERATIONAL NEEDS FROM TIME  
TO TIME.

VII. CO-ORDINATION.

13. THIS MEMORANDUM HAS BEEN CO-ORDINATED WITH THE AMF DIRECTORS OF  
SIGNALS AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, AND IS ENDORSED BY THE  
JIC(SC).

VIII. RECOMMENDATION.

14. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE REQUEST MADE IN THE ATTACHED  
SIGNAL FROM DIRECTOR GCHQ SHOULD BE AGREED TO, AND THAT  
AUSTRALIAN IMPLEMENTATION SHOULD PROCEED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE  
ARRANGEMENTS OUTLINED ABOVE.

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