

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

TO BE KEPT UNDER COMBINATION LOCK AND NEVER REMOVED FROM THE
OFFICE UNLESS TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REGULATIONS

26/3/21

INCREASE IN AUSTRALIAN CONTRIBUTION TO SIGINT RESOURCES
IN MALAYSIA - CONTINGENCY PLANNING

DAS (DP)

I attach a draft reply to the Minister's comments on the
above submission.

2. In view of the broader issues involved I suggest that it
might be desirable for the appropriate committees to be informed both
of the Minister's comments on the submission and of the Secretary's
reply.

MB
(R.D. BOTTERILL)
for Director,
Defence Signals Division
7th April, 1965

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

FOUO 92a

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

TO BE KEPT UNDER COMBINATION LOCK AND NEVER REMOVED FROM THE
OFFICE UNLESS TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REGULATIONS.

Declassified by ASD - 09/11/2021
Information removed for national
security and/or personal sensitivities

Possible Need for Further Personnel

Further requirements could certainly arise for interception resources in Singapore/Borneo additional to those stated in the Defence Committee submission. Existing resources against Indonesia are minimal and we are at present, for example, in fact intercepting less than 10% of Indonesian Ground Forces HF communications;

Any major change in this situation such as a more active phase of confrontation could present a need for additional resources.

It may be noted that some increase in interception capacity can be achieved - for short periods only - by the introduction of extended working (i.e. 56 hours per week) at stations and contingency plans exist for implementing this if required.

Availability of Trained Australian Manpower

With the resources at present available, the transfer to Singapore of the additional 13 AMF personnel proposed in the Defence Committee submission would represent the most that could reasonably be sent without prejudice to existing commitments, though some further adjustments might be possible on a short-term basis if a sufficiently grave emergency arose.

Proposals made in last year's Sigint Review and endorsed by the Defence Committee provided for increases in AMF and RAAF Sigint manpower ceilings (of 95, including 45 WRAAC, for the AMF and 45 for the RAAF) to enable these Services to meet growing commitments, and consideration is being given to the inclusion of a similar proposal in respect of the RAN in this year's Review. Due to problems in recruiting and the long lead time involved in training the effects of the newly approved AMF and RAAF ceilings have not yet been felt, but their implementation will progressively improve our capability to respond to urgent requirements in Singapore/Borneo relating to the Indonesian confrontation of Malaysia.

Availability of U.K. Resources

Of the 17 extra U.K. personnel referred to in para.4 of the submission it may be noted that 12 have already been called for by DSD and are now in post.

The ability of the U.K. to provide additional resources depends on the circumstances of the requirement. If it arises at very short notice the U.K. capability would be fairly limited, since few operators are trained on Indonesian (a normal U.K. Service operator requires about 3 months training to obtain reasonable competence on Indonesian tasks); if the opportunity exists for a longer term build-up, a larger number of U.K. personnel would be potentially available. In either case, however, the deployment of personnel to Singapore/Borneo would have to be at the expense of other high priority U.K. commitments

and availability would depend on the relative priority of the requirements at the time.

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~