Om TO BE KEPT UNDER COMBINATION LOCK AND NEVER REMOVED FROM THE OFFICE UNLESS TRANSMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REGULATIONS. I copyon Defence Signals Branch, Ref. No.: 31/9/59 C/o Defence Registry, 31/9/56 Victoria Barracks, MELBOURNE 5th February, 1963 Declassified by ASD - 22/11/2021 Information removed for national and/or personal sensitivities C.O., 3 TELU Processing of Indonesian Air The Borneo situation is obviously hotting up and we can expect to see a continuing increase in Indonesian subversion and/or infiltration of British Borneo, and in Indonesian attempts to torpedo Malaysia. The appointment of a Director of Operations in Brunei backed by a local

The Borneo situation is obviously hotting up and we can expect to see a continuing increase in Indonesian subversion and/or infiltration of British Borneo, and in Indonesian attempts to torpedo Malaysia. The appointment of a Director of Operations in Brunei backed by a local Director of Intelligence and Staff is reminiscent of the anti-MCP operations in Malaya under Sir Gerald Templar. Clearly Sigint is going to be under pressure to produce the most timely intelligence in the greatest possible detail - I think the need (and pressure on us) will be even greater than it was

Borneo the British are directly involved and lives of British nationals are at stake.

2. We cannot therefore afford to sit back complacently and expect consumers to accept delays in receipt of Comint caused by the signalling of raw from UKF 200 to AUA 375 and then back to Singapore and Brunei - such delays must be in the order of 12-24 hours even if OI treatment is given material and even though AUA 375's processing effort is nut into higher gear

I believe we will have no choice

but to transfer to UKF 200 some of your processing responsibility (the last week has shown the need for UKF 200 to disseminate information concerning the TU-16 KS flights near Singapore and Borneo).

3. We are planning therefore - subject of course to the availability of adequate resources in UKF 200 - to give UKF 200 responsibility (under the direct control of AUA 375) for the processing and reporting of

(a) intercepted at UKF 200;
 (b) take intercepted at UKF 200;
 (c) all Hagelin messages passed on links to Borneo which are intercepted at UKF 200.

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4. Your own intercept of etc. must of course be processed at AUA 375 and you must retain overall responsibility for the processing of the material taken by UKF 200 (even though UKF 200 does initial processing for T reporting). It is not envisaged at this stage that UKF 200 should process all cypher taken in Singapore on

it will process only the cypher passed on Borneo links. This might mean that messages passed on an

not be processed quickly at UKF 200 - however I hope that if anything relates to Borneo, a Borneo airfield/authority will appear as an info addressee of the message and UKF 200 will therefore catch it on its relay to the particular Borneo W/T station. Clearly however we will need to keep the processing split between UKF 200 and AUA 375 under close review and we do not intend to lay down more than a guide at this stage.

5. The above split need not of course be implemented immediately - I think we have a couple of months to prepare ourselves. However, UKF 200 at present is so deficient in Indonesian linguists that we cannot contemplate dividing effort until a reinforcement is effected. There has, as you know, been talk for the past two years of sending an RAAF (DAFI) linguist to UKF 200 for training, and W/O would be admirably suited to the above task at Singapore. However, DSB has always insisted that no posting action should be taken which reduces the AUA 375 linguistic strength below that required for effective and timely processing. However, I suspect that with the arrival of F/Lt at AUA 375, and the acclimatisation of Sgt over the past month or so, you could afford to release W/O to Singapore in say April.

6. I hope to visit you in the next month in company with IL-2 and CN (formal signals requesting approval will follow when we fix tentative dates) to keep the promise I made you late last year. We hope to discuss all the above in greater detail then. In the meantime I should be grateful if you would start thinking as to whether you might be able to release W/O to UKF 200 in April and about the problems associated with the processing of part of the task at UKF 200.

7. Finally I wish to reiterate that any processing effort at UKF 200 (or at a Tactical Unit in Borneo if we need to send one in at a later stage) will be under the direct control of AUA 375. DSB's role will be one of general supervision only.

AD(C)

For info : IL-2 (2 copies)
D Tels
UKE 200

UKF 200 GCO Singapore DAFI
GCHQ (K32)
AUSLO(W)
CLO
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