

TOP SECRET DINAR

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE

S.200

MINUTE PAPER

Subject

TACTICAL "Y" SUPPORT IN THE BORNEO TERRITORIES

FOLIO 84

PAS(B)

Reference: Department of Defence Minute dated 8th August, 1963.

The Joint Intelligence Committee (S/C) considered the above subject at its meeting on 5th September, 1963, and agreed the following views.

2. The general situation regarding Australian Sigt manpower is such that increased commitments would require an increased manpower allocation. This would involve recruitment and training problems, probably no less difficult than those facing the British Services in the situation under discussion.

3. Present Australian resources in Singapore would permit the deployment of a unit to meet the British requirement but on a short-term basis only and early withdrawal of the unit would be necessary. However, it would not be likely that the situation which necessitated the deployment of a unit would be of short duration.

4. The immediate effects of the deployment of a unit would be that:-

(a) a reduction of cover in Singapore would ensue, probably at a time when this could not be accepted;

(b)

(c) replacement of personnel in all existing posts would become increasingly difficult.

5. If the unit were provided, Australia could not then meet SEATO contingency plans until a recruitment and training programme, which then would have to be initiated, became effective in not less than two years.

6. However, the alternative British request for 2 or 3 Indonesian linguists could be met without difficulty.



Colonel
Acting Chairman,
Joint Intelligence Committee

6 September, 1963.

D/DSB. For information

Quilled H.H.

Chairman
Joint Intelligence Committee

9 Sep 63

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