AD(a)

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Government Communications Office
HQ Far East Command
Block G
Phoenix Park
Singapore, 10.

26

GCO/6017/10/26

2nd. April, 1965.

Copy No 24 of 33 Copies.

OC.

ignas B

VISIT TO BORNEO BY GCO, O.C. 7 SIGS REGT (AUST) AND 124 SQN;

29 MARCH - 1 APRIL MATTERS ARISING Db.

I. INTERCEPTION

(LABUAN)

AD(e)

AD(D)

The new installation, giving eleven double positions with rackspace for further three, is complete except for:-

 (a) air-conditioners: these have arrived on the island and are expected to be fitted within the next 7 - 10 days, but some further chasing by W.O. i/c may be required;

Action: W.O. i/c

(b) completion of feeders from JCC aerial farm to together with erection in JCC aerial farm of L.P. aerial (partly for JCC use but available also for

: CR Sigs BORNEO has in hand and G3 (Int) (S) should keep in touch with him on these points. The LPA aerial should improve the effectiveness of the station's cover, the results from which have so far been disappointing;

Action: G3 (Int) (S)

(c) accommodation (domestic) for personnel: CR Sigs has in hand and G3 (Int) (S) should maintain contact with CR Sigs on this.

Action: G3 (Int) (S).

(KUCHING)

2. The new operations building is almost complete and has been wired: the AMF installation team is now fitting racks and equipment (twelve positions). Estimated completion date is end of April. The contractor has failed to fit steel-lined doors and security locks as called for in the Q brief: O.C. has been instructed to pursue this point.

Action: O.U.

3. Some preliminary jungle-clearance has been carried out of the ground on the far side of the perimeter fence earmarked for the new aerial farm, and masts from MOD Army are awaited. When these arrive aerial erection will be carried out by the Unit.

Action: DI(MI)24

0.C.

TOP SECRET DIVAR

-2-

CENERAL

INTERFERENCE It was agreed that initial action on interference reported by should in future lie with G3 (Int) (S), pursuing with CR Sigs and reporting to GCO if the problem is not susceptible to a local solution.

Action:

G3 (Int) (S)

5. VOICE COVER In view of (a) the increasing pressure on sparse linguist resources, (b) the problem created by the introduction of Javanese on some Voice nets, and (c) references in end-product to Indonesian plans for use of telephone lines in place of R/T, a study of the extent and value of the present Voice effort in BORNEO was carried out. Details are as -: משפונר "-

- (One voice operator, two Voice positions), (a) main cover is of 2 Coy Combat Team of 1 Bn Combat Team KKO: this Coy net uses Indonesian Voice almost entirely (P/L and crade:). There is also some Voice on 1 BCT Bn net and a number of development items.
- (b) At (Three Voice operators, three Voice positions), the withdrawal of 305 En to flankguard rohe has removed one prolific source of Indonesian Voice. Cover is now mainly on the Bn Voice nets of H, I and J Bns (5 Bde), passing Javanese P/T and code traffic; in addition a number of Javanese Voice nets are under development, including possibly the Coy Voice net of H Bn. targets which may also use Javanese could include the Bn nets of 9 Rde. V Mandau Bde (MOBRIG) makes some use of the 120', MD Voice net and this appears to be area which still uses the only net in Indonesian (as distinct from Javanese) Voice: increased use of Indonesian Voice by Mandau Bde is a distinct possibility for the future.
- resources include one Voles operator who has some self-taught Javanese, but there is a need, is to be capable of direct reporting to W Bde under the "24 hours" rule (see para ? of GCO/6558/1026/4 of 11th Merch)- copy attached at Appendix D, - for the Proop to have one trained in ea Januar ilingulst oritis strengthy b on the each ca.
- (d) The above recommendation carries the corollary that the training of Javanese linguists (e.g. Singapore) should be pressed forward as a matter of high priority: GCO and OC 121 Sqn will investigate the local possibilities for such training.
- (e) At present it seems clear that a reduction of Voice cover at either of the two BORNEO sites, would directly affect the flow of intelligence to customers (FARELF, DOBOPS, JFHQ and at the Brigades) and that more time is needed, therefore, to assess the fractitably comp ling claims of on the one hand, and the processing at UKC 200 on the other, for linguists. It is strongly recommended that no reduction of the BORNEO Voice effort should be made at this stage.

OLUME DESIGN

189 SEGULT WHILE

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(f) DSD is invited to comment on sub-paras (a) - (e) above, which inevitably reflect a local view of the situation but which may be useful in assessing the importance of Voice cover-including Javanese Voice cover - to BORNEO customers.

Action: DSD.



II. DUTIES OF G3 (INT) (S)

Now that the JFHQ cell is in operation and end-product is flowing in from UKC 200, it is evident that G3 (Int) (S) will NOT have time to spend on normal desk-officer duties as was envisaged in his original TOR (attached at App. A). It is recommended that these be amended as follows:-

- (a) delete para 5 in toto;
- (b) insert new para 5 as follows:

"His primary routine responsibility will be to receive end-product disseminated to JFHQ LABUAN and to ensure its further dissemination not only within HQ DOBOPS and JFHQ but also to W Bde, Mid-West Bde, Central Bde and (on a strictly personal basis) the OC of the British Bn in E Bde. He will keep GCO(S), DSD,UKC 200 and G (Int) FARELF informed (by daily signal) of the further distribution (outside HQ DOBOPS and JFHQ) given to end-product initially received by him.";

- (c) in para 6: amend "under paras 2-4 above" to read "under paras 2-5 above."
- 7. Recipients are requested to comment on the above proposed changes: GCHQ and DSD are asked to consult as necessary with DI (MI) 24 and MI8 Canberra respectively.



Action: GCHQ
DSD
G (Int) FARELF
GSO I (Int) DOBOFS
GSO II (Int)
COMLANDBOR.

8. Although the above proposal, if accepted, will bring some badly-needed relief to G3 (Int) (S), who is at present grossly overburdened, his need for a Clerk to assist him with typing, filing and as cell-custodian in his absence remains. CC. 121 Sqn has undertaken to provide some strictly temporary help in the form of a Cy Op detached from ; however, the main need is to ensure that the successor (due in June) to the present COMLANDBOR Int Clerk (Sgt. FISHVICK), who cannot be indoctrinated to Category III, is FV stage Four cleared before posting to BORNEO, so that he may be indoctrinated on or before his arrival at JFHQ.

Action: OC 121 Sqn G (Int) FARELF.

III. PROVISION OF END-PRODUCT TO BORNEO RECIPIENTS

- 9. The main problems to date in operating the system outlined in GCO/6588/1026/4 of 11th March, 1965 have been:-
 - (a) the heavy burden imposed on G3 (Int) (s) by duties not forming part of his primary responsibility;

- (b) the need to send a proportion of end-product to JFHQ by bag rather than signal, in order to avoid overburdening signal communications;
- (c) poor bag services between SINGAPORE and BORNEO and within BORNEO.
- 10. These problems are all in process of solution. Thus:-
 - (a) paras 6-7 recommend the necessary changes to G3 (Int) (S)'s TOR;
 - (b) BID-30 is now working on the Singapore/Labuan link (see para 2) and on the links Singapore/ Kuching and Labuan/Kuching BID 30 working is expected to begin during the latter half of April (see paras: 23-24);
 - (c) OC 121 Sqn has carried out a thorough survey of bag services and details of those now available for carriage of SIGINT (including Category III) material are at Appendix B: R Division, GCHQ is asked to state whether these are acceptable and, if necessary to seek the agreement of Security Committee LSIB.

Action: GCHQ (R)

- 11. W Bde requirements are the largest and most urgent of all the BORNEO customer requirements at Bde level. It is for consideration, therefore, whether there may not be a case for making W Bde a regular direct customer for all end-product related to enemy activity opposite W Bde area. On the other hand:-
 - (a) there is a risk of overburdening G3 (Int) W Bde with too great a volume of material;
 - (b) it should in general be simpler for G3 (Int) W Bde to keep G3 (Int) (S) advised of his requirements rather than through the GCO/DSD machinery.
- 12. On balance, therefore, and with the full concurrence of DOBOPS, it is recommended that the present system, which includes provision for a direct service to W Bde of really urgent items, should continue for a further 2-3 weeks, after which GCO should review the matter again in consultation with the appropriate authorities in W Bde, JFHQ, DOBOPS and FARELF.

Action: GCO

is limited to bag carried by an indoctrinated officer or NCO, or (exceptionally) CTP passed over Service signal channels with pads held and by G3 (Int) Cent Bde. When the measures in para 26 have been completed, the service will normally be by bag (as at Appendix B) with SINGLET and CTP facilities available for signalling urgent items. At this point, it would be legitimate, from a SIGINT viewpoint, for Cent Bde also to receive its own copy of the JICFE Supplement, but whether this should be provided is a matter for JICFE to consider. Secretary JICFE is invited to raise this accordingly, first consulting G (Int) FARELF.

Action: Sec JICFE.

IN DEPUT

14. For the present, SIGINT material may go to G3 (Int) Mid-West Bde via the KUCHING/SIBU bag service (see App. B) on a "read and destroy" or "read and return" basis from G3 (Int) W Bde (to whom, therefore, G3 (Int) (S) should route items of interest to Mid-West Bde as well as those which concern W Bde). When the measures detailed in para 27 have been taken, the service will be as follows:-

- (a) selection by G3 (Int) (S), backed up as necessary by a "second look" on the part of G3 (Int) W Bde;
- (b) bag LAPUAN/SIEU;
- (c) exceptionally, by signal for urgent items, these to be routed over the SIGINT (BID-30) link from LABUAN to KUCHING and thence (SINGLET, with OTP as back-up, wer existing signal channels) to G3 (Int) SIBU;
- (d) direct service from UKC 200 (via and onwards as in (b) or (c) above, for "48 hour" items, or (rarely) from direct (as in (c) above) for "24 hour" items
- 15. As in the case of Cen: Pde (see para 13), there would likewise be no SIGINT objection to Mid-West Bde receiving its own copy of the JICFE Supplement once the measures in para have been implemented, but this is for JICFE to decide.

Action: Sec JICFE first consulting G (Int) FARELF.

- 16. The importance was stressed and readily agreed of NOT sending selected end-product or SIGINT-based evaluations (including for example the JICFE Supplement) to the British Bn in E Bde (currently 42 Cdo) except under the following conditions:-
 - (a) only the Pn Cmd himself to be shown such items;
 - (b) all items to be shown to Bn Cmd by G3 (Int) (S) on by a member of JFHQ/DOBOPS Int staff briefed by G3 (X it) (S); the golden rule is NOT to reveal any SIGINT information to the Bn Cmd without discussing with him precisely how (if at all) it can be used (see Section IV below) in such a way as not to abouse suspicion on the part cither of the enemy or the Malaysian Bde CMd and his staff.

Action: G3 (Int) (S)

SLO KUCHING, who now becomes SLO BONNEO under the new SLO organisation (see App. C), raised two possibilities with GCO, wiz:-

- (a) a direct service to SLO (B) (KUCHING) rather than (as now) the provision of gists and extracts prepared by his SINGAPORE representative;
- (b) one "feed-in" point for all customers (military and civilian) in KUCHING, rather than three (W Bde via JFHQ, SLO (B) via SLO(B) Rep. SINGAPORE, and RSO KUCHING via RSO SINGAPORE) as at present.
- 17. On (a), GCO saw no objection in principl but said that the communications problems would need further consideration. On (b) GCO pointed out that a central "feed-in" point would prosuppose the nomination of one individual in KUCHING to select material for the three recipients: the alternative would be for all three to see every item, which might impose a considerable burden on those concerned.

 The agreed to broad further on both possibilities and to discuss with GCO and resconcerned in due course.

Action: SLO (B).

TOP SEURET TEAM

19 SLO (B), KUCHING, also undertook to let GCO know what arrangements he would propose for the provision of selected end-product items to the newly-appointed SLO JESSELTON.

Action: SLO(B).

IV. ACTION ON SIGINT

- 20. * This subject was discussed in the BORNEO context during visits to Mid-West Bde, W Bde, Cent Bde, JFHQ and DOBOPS. All concerned showed a ready understanding of the importance of preserving our SIGINT sources; GCO indicated that while each case must obviously be dealt with on its mertis, and with reference back to GCO via G3 (Int) (S) on any points of difficulty that arose, the main guidelines should be:-
 - (a) As far as possible, translate SIGINT into operational orders. It is better to say to a Bm Cmd, "Watch your left flank", than "We think an attack on your left flank is imminent."
 - (b) If compelled to make an "intelligence" statement to Bn Cmds (rather than sticking to (a) above), the information MUST be suitably generalised. Thus, to say "A very good source shows that the enemy is intending to mount recce patrols against the following places (X,Y and Z)" is WRONC; to say "We are inclined to think that the enemy may be planning to deploy patrols in the general area Q "This area would incorporate the particular places X, Y and Z, is MUCH BETTER.
 - (2) The invention of spurious sources ("James Bond" etc) is to be avoided and should NEVER be done without consulting GCO via G3 (Int) (S).
 - (d) The use of collateral (ground sources, etc.) being guided by SIGINT in selecting the "right" collateral item - is by far the BEST method whenever feasible.
 - (e) It is important that any action taken by our forces as a result of SIGINT information should be so carried out as NOT to arouse enemy suspicions of our extraordinary percipience. One good way of achieving this object is to "generalise" such action: for example, to bring down mortar-fire on one jungle-trail (known from SIGINT as a likely enemy approach/withdrawal route) is RISKY: to mortar several jungle-trails (one of which is known as a good likely target from SIGINT) is MUCH SAFER.
- In practice the above simple rules (which have been deliberately expressed as such) have been and are being followed very successfully and the a commendable degree of ingenuity. In particular Mid-West Bde have so far experienced no difficulty in applying them (especially that in para (a) and (d) as a means of steering the Malaysian Bn under command (3 RMR).

COMMUNICATIONS AND SPECIAL SECURITY MEASURES.

- 22 SINGAPORE/LABUAN. The circuit is now working with BID-30: two equipments have been installed at and a third (on loan to JCC) is available when required.
- 23. SINCAPORE/KUCHING: The joint V Bde/ BID-30 room now hold 5 BID-30 equipments (three belonging to , two to W Bde); but two of those belonging to are not yet operating. OC 121 Sqn will send out the two E Techs to instal these two BID-30's. It is estimated

Un service dispersion

that this circuit will be working on BID-30 by late April.

..7 ..

Action: OC 121 Sqn.

2: LABUAN/KUCHING: Communication will normally be via UKC 200 but provision has been previously made for off-line use, on an "as required" basis, of either of the direct (joint Service) circuits (rented P and T circuit and D-11 circuit). CR Sigs BORNEO agreed to consider sympathetically making this direct service available (as an overflow from the normal /UKC 200/):-

- (a) on-line (BID-30) patched through to and
- (b) on a sked basis (three two-hour skeds a day), with the understanding that the circuit would be returned to its normal users when NOT required by the SIGINT users.

In the first instance CR Sigs BORNEO will arrange engineering tests once BID-30 is in operation at KUCHING.

Action: CR Sigs BORNEO

LABUAN/BRUNEI Outstanding problems here are:-

- (a) indoctrination clearances still awaited (see para 29 (b);
- (b) securing the safe to be used for storage of STGINT: this is in hand and G3 (Int) Cent Bde will notify G3 (Int) (S) when this has been done, G3 (Int) (S) then to carry out his own check on the safe and notify GCO;

Action: G3 (Int) Cent Bde.
G3 (Int) (S)

(c) improvement of bag service (as in App. B) to required security standards: hitherto SDS bags have been left unguarded in the ATLO office on BRUNEI Airfield and this is NOT acceptable for SIGINT material.

LABUAN/SIBU. Outstanding action required is:-

- (a) security measures for storage of SIGINT (in cell adjacent to Ops Room on third floor of Mid-West Bde HQ) viz.
 - (i) steel sheet on door of room plus approved lock;
 - (ii) sound-proofing ventilater slot on wall adjacent to corridor;
- (iii) brick-in or otherwise secure safe;
- (iv) provide combination-lock on safe or combination-locked blister covering keyhole of safe;

Action: G3 (Int) Mid-West Bde

(b) indoctrination clearances still awaited (see para 29 (c);

Action: G (Int) FARELF

TOP SECRET DIMAR

1.11.10

(c) clarification of details on LABUAN/SIBU bag service (See App. B).

Action: OC 121 Sqn.

ALVIS. It was noted that wiring requirements may delay the installation of ALVIS at JCC LABUAN and Bde Sigcen RUCHING: CR Sigs is already looking into this and OC 121 Sqn also undertook to let OC Bde Sigcen KUCHING have details of the wiring requirements. 1.10 m eo elocr 松夫

Action:t00 121 Sqn.

in any event, it seems clear that the introduction of ALVIS on SIGINT circuits must be carefully phased with the introduction of ALVIS on normal Service circuits to and within BORNEO.

VI. INDOCTRINATIONS

The following indoctrination clearances are outstanding and are required as soon as possible:-

> (a) W Bde: (BM designate) due to arrive 23 April. The Bde Cmd states, with obvious justification, that to have an unindoctrinated BM in a Bde so dependent on SIGINT would be quite unacceptable.

Action: G(Int) FARELF

(b) Cent Bde: (Ede Sigs Offr) has, in default of Category III clearance, been given a non-codeword SECRET briefing, but his indoctrination remains highly desirable. At present only one Cy) has been indoctrinated and clearance is awaited for a second Cy Op (

Action: G (Int) FARELF

(c) Mid-West Bde: A new BM and new G3 (Int) are expected shortly: G3 (Int) Mid-West Bde should notify G3 (Int) (S) as soon as details are available so that clearances for their indoctrination may be sought.

Action: G3 (Int) Mid-West Bde.

One Cy Op indoctrination application (WO II and also an application for inductrination of the P.I.), are required if the arrangements for Sgt. (sending SIGINT material and securely storing it at Mid-West Bde are to work satisfactorily.

Action: C (Int) FARELF.

(d) JFHQ: mention has already been made (para 8) of the need to ensure that the new Int Sgt can be indoctrinated; G (Int) FARELF is asked to continue pursuing with MCD Army as a matter of urgency.

Action: G (Int) FARELF.

In order to provide facilities for Mid-Vest indoctrinations at times when it may not be possible for G3 (Int) V Bde or G3 (Int) (S) to visit SIBU, it is suggested that G (Int) FARELF should authorise G3 (Int) Mid-West Bde, exceptionally, to indoctrinate appropriately cleared members of Mid-West Bde staff. G (Int) FARELF comments are requested.

Action: G (Int) FARELF

Some time ago G (Int) FARELF mentioned to GCO the possibility of indoctrinating MIO's in BORNEO. This was independently mentioned as highly desirable by G3 (Int) Mid-West Bde, and FARELF may therefore wish to pursue the idea further.

Action: G (Int) FARELF

TERMS OF REFERENCE - G3 (INT) (S)

- 1. The occupant of the post will be on the establishment of 121 Sig Sqn but will be detached for duty on HQ COMLANDBOR G(Int) Staff.
- 2. He will be responsible for the operation and security of the Sigint cell at JFHQ. In particular he will:
 - (a) ensure that all Sigint material available to DOBOPS and/or JFHQ is securely held in the JFHQ cell;
 - (b) ensure that this material is available to authorized indoctrinated persons only;
 - (c) arrange for receipt and despatch of all Comint-graded material coming into or leaving JFH;
 - (d) act as the channel through Which Comint indoctrinated members discover who, in other HQ's or organizations, is similarly indoctrinated:
 - (e) report and investigate any breaches of IRSIC :
 - (f) advise on Comint security, matters (e.g. distribution, physical security, classification and grading etc.)
- 3. In fulfilment of his responsibilities under para 2 he will, in consultation with DOBOFS and COMLANDBOR (G Int), formulate and maintain his own standing operating procedures, to which he will obtain the agreement of GCO (Singapore).
- 4. He will be responsible to GCO (Singapore) for:
 - (a) liaison with all service consumers of Sigint in BCRNEO on their Sigint requirements;
 - (b) any other Sigint matters that BORNEO consumers may raise with him or that he may be required by GCO (Singapore) to raise with them e.g. the operational use, or interception carried cuties other than Sigint units or authorities.
- 5. As often as his other duties (paras 2 4 above) permit, he will be available to COMLANDBOR (G Int) for any duties the latter may specify in nection wit the evaluation of Sigint or related intelligence material i.e. this capacity he may be regarded as a GSO III (Int) and perform normal desk duties.
- 6. He will normally correspond direct with GCO (Singapore) in connection with his responsibilities under paras 2 -4 above, but will copy all such correspondence to OC 121 Sig Sqn, whenever appropriate.
- 7. He will be subject to the control of OC 121 Sig Sqn concerning:
 - (a) Duties to be performed as an officer of 12% Sig Sqn as may be agreed,
 - (b) matters of Australian administration. His parent unit will remain 121 Sig Sqn and his tour of duty to BORNEO will NOT exceed 6 months for any one period and will be relieved approx every four months under arrangements by OC 121 Sig Sqn.



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BORNEO BAG SERVICES

For civil customers in BORNEO, authorisation has already been given to use:-

- (a) RSO bag services;
- (b) for certain SLO(E) Codeword material, personal carriage by hand of SLO (B) or an indoctrinated member of his staff.
- What follows deals with the bag services to be used in conveying Codeword material intended for military recipients in BONNEO. R Division GCHQ, is requested to comment and to seek, if necessary, the concurence of Security Committee LSIB.

SINGAPORE/LABUAN

3.

The routing is: (i) GCO, (ii) GCO/UKC 200 courier to UKC 200.

(iii) UKC 200 courier to RAF SELETAR;

(iv) Special Despatch Service (SDS) courier to

(v) SDS courier to LABUAN;

(vi) SDS courier from LABUAN Airport to JCC;

(vii) collected by courier from JCC for

- delivery to G3 (Int) (S); (viii) G3 (Int) (S) retains or delivers to ultimate addressee as appropriate, the item or items being normally kept in the JFHQ SIGINT cell (and NEVER being kept outside the latter overnight).
- Irrespective of ultimate addressee (DOBOPS, JFHQ, etc), Codeword items should be addressed:-
 - (a) inner envelope: TOP SECRET: Capt. T. Richards, G3 (Int) (S);
 - (b) outer envelope: TO BE OPENED ONLY BY ADDRESSEE: Capt. T. Richards, G3 (Int)

The same process in reverse applies to LABUAN/SINGAPORE items, the med addressee being , A/GCO (Ops).

SINGAPORE/KUCHING

Routing is as in para 3, but for LABUAN read KUCHING. Addressing is as in para 4 but for "Capt. T. Richards, G3 (Int) (S) ' read "Capt. N. White, G3 (Int)".

KUCHING/SIBU

- 7. Routing is:-
- (a)G Staff arrange and W Bde Sig Sqn provide escorted courier to KUCHING Airport;
- (b) bag is carried by hand of officer travelling in civil aircraft;
- (c) GStaff armange for collection by escorted courier, provided from the Mid-West Bde Sig Sqn.

Three envelopes are required viz;



TOP SECRET DINAR

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- (a) Liner envelope: TOP SEURM: Capt. J. Heid, G3 (Int).
- (b) second envelope: TO BE OP NOTO ONLY BE ADDRESSEE: Capt. J. Reid, G3 (Int).
- (c) Outer envelope | Mid-West Bde (Ops Branch).
- 9. For STPU/NUCHING the routing is the reverse of para 7, but two envelopes only are required viz:-
 - (a) impor: TOP SECRET: Capt. N. White, G3 (Int);
 - (b) Outer: TO BE OPENED ONLY BE ADDRESSEE: Capt, N. White, G3 (Int).

LABUAN/BRUNEI and LABUAN/KUCHING

- 10. The intended system is as follows:-
 - (a) the bag will be carried either by a number of AMF or by Army pilot, and will by this means be conveyed on a suitable Labuan/Brunei flight;
 - (b) 2.7t 3de Sig Sqn will provide escorted courier to meet the flight in (a);
 - (c) items for Cent 3de will be passed by Sig Sqn courier to G5 (Int) direct;
 - (d) litems for W Bde will be passed to SDS for carriage to KUCHING (the SDS service operating on the came lines as for KUCHING/SIBU, see para 7)
- 11. Items for Cent Rio will be addressed:
 - (a) inner envelope: TOP SECRET. Capt. J Morris G3 (Int) Cent Bde.
 - (b) cuter envelope: TO BE OPENED ONLY BY ADDRESSEE: Capt. J. Morris, G3 (Int) Cent Bde.
- 12. Items for W Bie will be addressed as in para 11 but for "Capt. J. Morris, G3 (Int) Cent Bde" read "Capt. N White, G3 (Int) W Bde".

1 W/SIBU

13. This is under investigation by OC 121 Sqn; thereafter details will be sent by GCO to all concerned.

(Action: CJ 121 Sqr GCO

TOP SECRET DINAR

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Appendix C

SLO BORNEO ORGANISATION

The new organisation is as follows:-

- (a) *SLO (B) () is located in KUCHING.

 (b) Under SLO (B) are:
 i. SLO (B) Rep. SINGAPORE ();

 ii. SLO JESSELTON (not yet in post).
- 2. For the present end-product addressed SLO (B) will be sent to SLO (B) Rep. SINGAPORE, and it will be for him to ensure that appropriate items, gists, etc. are passed to SLO (B) himself. See, however, paras 17-19 of main body of report.

KOP SECRET

appendix D

Government Communications Office,

HQ Far East Command,

Block G,

Phoenix Park,

Singapore, 10.

GCO/6558/1026/4

G (Int) FARELF (copies)

SLO Borneo (2 copies)

11 H March 1965,

Copies to:

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PROVISION OF SIGINT END_PRODUCT TO BORNEO RECIPIENTS


The following summarises the arrangements which have now been made, in consultation with you and with other appropriate authorities, for a more speedy and efficient system of providing SIGINT End-Product to military recipients (R.N., Army and RAF), in BORNEO.

- 2. DSD, UKC 200 () or other SIGINT producers, will in future include JFHQ LABUAN as an addressee on all end-product items referring to the dispositions, activities and intentions of Indonesian forces (Naval, Military, Air and Covert) which are engaged in, or designated for, operations against EAST MALAYSIA and/or BRUNEI. Such items will be issued by UKC 200 under the address symbol and will for the present:-
 - (a) be signalled if issued at procedence OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE or above;
 - (b) Be sent by bag if issued at precedence ROUTINE (delivery by bag normally takes two days, plus an extra day for intervening week-ends);
 - (c) be either by bag or by signal, at the producing authorities discretion, if issued at precedence PRIORITY
- In this connection it should be noted that:-
 - (a) all UKC 200 end-product reports bearing the address symbol will automatically be set to JFHQ LABUAN by signal;
 - (b) all TKC 200 end-product reports bearing the address symbol will be sent to JFHQ LABUAN by bag
 - (c) all end-product reports addressed to JFHQ which are issued by producers other than UKC 200 (e.g. DSD or) will be signalled, irrespective of precedence.
- 4. From about 1 April (precise date to be notified in due course), the introduction of improved crypto arrangements on the SIGINT circuit SINGAPORE/LABUAN will enable all items in the series to be passed to JFHQ by signal.

All end-product sent to JFHQ LABUAN in accordance with para 2

above will be kept in the SIGINT cell at JPHQ and the custody of this material will be the responsibility of GSO III (Int) (S) who is GCO's authorised representative in BORNEO. GSO III (Int) (S) will also be responsible for ensuring that:

- (a) end-product is seen by the appropriate LABUAN recipients, VIZ. the Intelligence staff of DOBOPS, COMLANDBOR, COMNAVBOR and COMAIRBOR;
- (b) in accordance with the wishes of the appropriate Intelligence staffs (see (a) above), enu-product is forwarded over SIGINT channels from LABURN to W Bde KUCHING, Mid west Bde SIBU, and Central Bde BRUNEI. (Note: arrangements for setting up secure SIGINT channels for passing selected items to mid-West and Central Bdos by signal have not yet been finalised; for the present courier services operated by GSO III (Int) (S) to Central Bde, and by GSO III (Int) W Bde to Mid West Bde, are the only authorised means available).
- 6. Normally, therefore, it will be the responsibility of GSO III (Int) (S), under instructions from GSO I (Int) DOBOPS and GSO II (Int) COMLANDBOR (or the latter's Nawal and Air equivalents) to ensure that items required by West Bde (including Forward Air Commander) Mid-West Bde and Central Bde are passed to the latter. However, in the event of any item being produced by UKC 200 which clearly refers to a significant event(e.g. a cross-border operation) planned to take place within the next 48 hours, WEST BDE KUCHING will be included by UKC 200 as an addressee for that item, which will accordingly be signalled direct to KUCHING by UKC 200 under the address symbol PLUS WEST BDE KUCHING.
- Neither of the two inercept sites in BORNEO (AUM 351, LABUAN, and KUCHING) have facilities for on-site processing and reporting, nor is it thought necessary or desirable to provide them with these at present. However, possesses a limited capability for on-site scanning of plain-text items only; in the event of any such item referring to a significant event (Indonesian cross-border operation, etc) due to take place within the next 24 hours, O.C. is authorised to inform GSO III (Int) West Bde direct of the content of the message, at the same time informing GCO and GSO III (Int) (S) LABUAN that he has taken this action. GCO and GSO III (Int) (S) will then be responsible for informing the appropriate authorities in SINGAPONE and LABUAN respectively that the item in question has been passed to W Bde.
- 8. Arrangements similar to those in paras 4-5 will be made for Mid-West Bde as soon as:
 - (a) secure communications manned by indoctrinated personnel are available;
 - (b) secure accommodation has been provided for storage of SIGINT material.
- 9. The above system which takes effect immediately, is without prejudice to any arrangements which SINGAPORE recipients may wish to make for forwarding, over SIGINT channels, selected items or evaluations derived from SIGINT material. Nor does the revised system in any way affect present arrangements for the forwarding by RSO or SLO (B) of SIGINT required by their representatives or other indoctrinated contacts in BORNEO.



Government Communications Officer.

TOP SECRET


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