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FOLIO (2a)
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BRIEF FOR C.G.S.

DEFENCE COMMITTEE AGENDUM 2 (S)/1964

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REQUEST FOR AUSTRALIAN TACTICAL SIGINT SUPPORT IN BORNEO

Matter Referred

1. Memorandum (Flag 'A') by Director DSD, in conjunction with DMI and D Sigs, concerning a request (Flag 'B') from Director GCHQ for Australian Tactical Sigint Support in Borneo.

Consideration

2. The DC have already been briefed at short notice by Director DSD on this request and their views are recorded in the Minute at Flag 'C'. In short the DC concluded that if Britain agreed to provide extra theatre personnel in Singapore [redacted] approval should be sought for the deployment of some 201 Sig Sqn personnel in Borneo.

3. The British have now agreed to provide extra civilian teams from UK, within 2 or 3 months. This would release four AMF operating teams. In addition, to step up the tactical sigint effort in Borneo the British intend to [redacted] and transfer additional army operators from Germany.

4. We agree in principle with Director DSD proposal and suggest that you read it in full. However, there are some points of detail on which we do NOT agree. The major elements of our plan are listed below together with reference to the DSD paper where we disagree.

5. Outline of Organisation

In order to streamline administration, to provide the best security and to ensure better control we consider that there should be two troops in Borneo at static sites - one AMF troop at Labuan (with a small British element) and one British Troop at Kuching (with a small Australian element). Both troops would be under operational control of GC 201 Sig Sqn (Singapore). (See DSD para 11 D). Availability of the right kind of tradesmen dictates the necessity to have a mixture of AMF and British at either site but this can be kept to a minimum. (e.g. Not more than 6 Australians would be at Kuching at any one time).

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6. Facilities needed to make Troops effective

At present British troops engaged in Sigint at Labuan and Kuching are operating under difficulties and efficiency leaves much to be desired. We consider it essential that the troops be self contained technically as far as possible and that one of the main requirements will be to provide exclusive communications from each site. This technical support is not available from either British or AMP resources in Singapore and manpower would have to come from Australia, mainly from Signals units other than 101 Wrls Regt (para 4 of DSD submission is not strictly true).

7. Manpower Requirement

The interception cover requirement has been carefully examined by DSD and the minimum economic deployment is four intercept teams at each site. Taking into account also personnel required for processing intercepted material, communications and technical maintenance the Australian manpower bill is as follows:

(a) Initial deployment

<u>Trade</u>	<u>Labuan</u>	<u>Kuching</u>	<u>Provided from</u>	
			<u>S'pore</u>	<u>Aust</u>
OC	1	-	-	1
NCO Supervisors	2	-	2	-
Operators Signals (Intercept)	16	-	16	-
Traffic Analysts (Int)	2	-	2	-
Technician Electronic(Cipher)	1 (also maintains eqpt at Kuching)	-	-	1
Technician Electronic	1	-	-	1
Operators Keyboard/ Radio	2	2	-	4
Operators Keyboard/ Cipher	2	2	-	4
Driver Electrician	1	-	-	1
Cooks	2	-	-	2
Total	1 Offr 29 OR	4 OR	20	1 Offr 13 OR
Total initial commitment				
1 Offr 33 OR				

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NOTE: The difference between the above figures and DSD estimate of 28 (paras 3 and 13) is due to a subsequent appreciation on our part that 4 additional operators keyboard and 2 cooks would be needed.

- (b) Follow up deployment - To occur when the situation demands a higher degree of local processing of intercept and direct reporting to Brigade Commanders.

<u>Trade</u>	<u>Labuan</u>	<u>Kuching</u>	<u>Provided from</u>	
			<u>S'pore</u>	<u>Aust</u>
Linguist (Int Corps)	1	2	1	2
Reporters (Int Corps)	1	-	-	1
Total	2	2	1	3

Total follow up commitment 4 OR

- (c) TOTAL AUSTRALIAN COMMITMENT

1 Offr 37 OR - Made up of - 1 Offr ¹⁶17 OR from AUST
20 OR from S'pore

Unless circumstances change radically, this total should enable self contained operation and allow, by rotation through Singapore, relief every four months.

- (d) Temporary detachment overseas

To permit a satisfactory installation of equipment and other technical facilities we consider a technical maintenance officer and two technicians should be detached to Borneo for approximately 4 weeks.

- (e) Defence Committee Approval would therefore be required to raise AMF overseas sigint ceiling from 80 to 98.

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8. British Contribution

As far as we can check at present the British contribution would total 1 Offr and 37 OR possibly to be disposed as follows:

<u>Initially</u> - Kuching -	1 Offr 20 OR
Labuan -	2 OR (Voice operators)
<u>Follow up</u> - Kuching -	5 OR
Labuan -	3 OR (Voice Op, Decrypter, Indexer)
<u>Reliefs at Singapore</u>	- 7 OR
<u>Total</u>	- 1 Offr 37 OR

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(This equality with the Australian figure is coincidental)

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9. Equipment

There are no problems with intercept equipment. However, communication equipment to provide the exclusive high capacity signal links required by DSD (See para 1(c)(i) of DSD submission) is not available from either Australian or British resources. The best we can do is to provide hand speed morse circuits

10. Effect on Australian Sigint Capability

We generally agree with Director DSD assessment at para 7 of his submission. It should be made clear however that if we commit troops to Borneo our capacity to provide Sigint Support to the Commonwealth Force under a SEATO Plan 4 or 6 situation would be limited to one troop to be despatched from Australia, i.e., about half of the support agreed by the DC.

11. Other Implications

Although the total Australian commitment is only 1 Officer and 37 ORs there will be an indirect strain placed on AMF resources in Australia caused by the requirement to relieve or replace personnel stationed overseas. This can only be done at the expense of SEATO and other possible commitments.

12. Security

The cover story proposed by DSD (para 11) is considered satisfactory for an AMF deployment at Labuan, but may not hold good at Kuching where there are no other Australian troops. Moreover, Kuching is a centre of COO activities and Indonesian infiltrators are known to be located there. For this reason we strongly recommend that the Australian troops be stationed at Labuan.

13. Timing

We do not agree with the timings proposed by DSD. (para 12) The main initial deployment from Singapore will depend on the take over of AMF positions there by the UK civilian operators. This will take 2 - 3 months. However, to save time and possibly to add credence to the cover story we propose that the technical installation group (see para 7(d) above) should move as soon as possible to provide necessary technical facilities.

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Recommendation

1b. We recommend that the Defence Committee:

(a) Approve -

- (i) The despatch to Borneo of a self contained AMF Tactical Sigtnt Troop of 1 Officer and 37 OR with the proviso that the troop be deployed at Labuan with a small detachment only at Kuching.
- (ii) the raising of the AMF overseas sigint ceiling of 50, by 18 to a total of 68.99
- (iii) the detachment from Australia for approximately one month of 1 officer and 2 other ranks to instal technical facilities in Borneo, and,


(b) Observe -

- (i) that the movement of the main party from Singapore will be dependent on the takeover there of AMF intercept positions by UK civilian operators.
- (ii) that the extent of the Australian commitment should be reviewed in November 1964.



Col D. Sims

5 May 64.



Col D. Sims

NOTE: Mr R. H. THOMPSON, Director DSD will be present at the DC Meeting on Thursday 7 May.

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