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BRIEF FOR DMI/D SIGS
JIC (SC) AGENDUM 6/1963

TACTICAL Y SUPPORT IN THE BORNEO TERRITORIES

1. The terms of a British request (submitted by the British High Commissioner to the Prime Ministers Department) for AMF Tactical Y Support in the Borneo Territories is at Flag 'A'. The proposals are in the nature of a contingency plan, to support British ground forces involved in hostilities or in the control of Indonesian inspired infiltration in Borneo. The British propose that the AMF provide on a standby basis:

- (a) A self contained Y Unit of 4 teams with vehicles and equipment (presumably including rearward comms equipment), if this is impossible,
- (b) The attachment to the British Y Unit of 2 to 3 AMF Indonesian linguists.

2. Secretary Defence requires JIC(SC) to make early observations on the proposal with particular reference to:

- (a) the practicability of making available the AMF resources
- (b) the effect of so doing on [REDACTED]

3. The views of Director DSB are at Flag 'B'. These should be read fully, I agree with them all but would like to draw attention to the last sentence in para 2 where it should be remembered that other Australian troops were involved.

4. I am sympathetic to the British request and concede that the AMF would get valuable experience but, apart from political considerations there are factors which militate against meeting their major request. These factors are considered below:

(a) General

From the Australian intelligence viewpoint it would be undesirable to reduce our capability at Singapore.

[REDACTED]
For this reason, if the request were to be met, AMF strength in Singapore would have to be built up by about 25 personnel

[REDACTED], Indonesia's present attitude towards Malaysia makes it possible that the contingency foreseen by the British will arise at any time.

(b) Availability of Manpower

Discounting administrative personnel there are 70 AMF operational personnel overseas and 85 operational personnel in Australia. Allowing for changeovers time this just allows us to maintain our present overseas strength as the duration of overseas postings is limited to 2½ years and must

33 short of establishment.

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arbitrarily be followed by a posting in Australia of similar duration. A long term commitment of a 4 team unit in Borneo could NOT therefore, be accepted unless our overall strength were built up accordingly. On present rates of enlistment and training this would take about two years.

[REDACTED]
Two
or three specialist linguist personnel could, however, be provided for Borneo without strain.

(c) Effect on SEATO Contingency Plans

In our commitment to provide Sigint Support to the Commonwealth Commander in either a counter insurgency or limited war situation in South East Asia it should be remembered that Australia's interests are directly served and it has been agreed that there would be an adjustment of existing Australian Sigint resources in the event of AMF deployment. I do NOT believe we could exclude the possibility that a situation could arise in the SEATO area which demanded AMF deployment at the same time that the contingency in Borneo might be current. These two commitments could NOT be met simultaneously unless we received authority to build up AMF resources considerably and had about two years to do this.

(d) Equipment

British owned ad hoc equipment and vehicles are held in Singapore and would be adequate for the task, except that DF capability is poor and some vehicles need air conditioning.

(e) Place of mounting the operation

If it were decided to give the highest priority to the provision of an AMF 4 team unit for support in the Borneo Territories it would be preferable to mount the operation from Singapore because:-

- (i) personnel with up to date knowledge and equipment are located there and training can continue,
- (ii) movement would be faster and less difficult to arrange than from Australia,
- (iii) [REDACTED]

RECOMMENDATION

5. I recommend you accept Director DSE recommendation that, if required, we provide 2 or 3 specialist linguists to support the British Y Unit and to encourage the British authorities to proceed with the expansion of their existing unit. It should be noted that approval

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has already been given for the covert detachment of one AMF linguist
to the British Y Unit to provide support in investigating low level
Indonesian communications proximate to the Borneo Territories.

30 Aug 63

Livingstone
Major
GSO 2 DMI (MI 8)

Distribution:

DMI
D Sigs
Director DSB (for info) ✓
JI Secty (JIC) (for info)

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