

Ref. No.: 2601/005 Date: 21st March. 1955

## AERIAL SYSTEM FOR

## Dr. G. de V. Gipps.

Your 125/10 of 7/3/55 I am afraid that I do not agree entirely with your interpretation of the operational requirement.

The reason why DSB agreed to send a detachment to was to meet, as far as possible, the requirement arising out of your analysis of the MCP intercept problem, as set out in your letter 115/5 of 4 May 1954.

In that letter you came to the conclusion that in respect of external links ".. it is probably unnecessary to make any special effort to intercept them at temporary positions set up in Malaya." To cover internal and tactical links however, two stations were desirable in addition to Singapore, one midway up the country and one in the north. For reasons which are not relevant to this discussion we felt unable to support two detachments and choose the north site as giving the better compromise, taking into consideration the support to be expected from TA3.

Therefore the role of , as seen here, is to intercept signals from Malaya only. i.e. there is no requirement for a "low angle" aerial.

There is now evidence for believing that the HQ of the MCP is situated within or adjacent to the territory controlled by the Northern Bureau on over near the THAI/MALAYA border at a distance of 50/100 miles from S.P. External links from such a HQ, or links to southern Malaya, where the second of the two "Bureaux" is situated, should both be within Singapore's cover, whilst return links from Johore should be audible at S.P. It is therefore considered that no redeployment of the Sungei Patani detachment is necessary to cope with this new situation nor does it affect the aerial problem at S.P.

To sum up, it seems to me that there is no need for the detachment to erect the aerial, a task which they might find difficult with service equipment. Do you agree?

AIN

(H. W. BERRY)

SECRET FIVOT