BATTLE OF MIDWAY ISLAND, 1942

The Battle of Midway Island - possibly the greatest Japanese naval defeat of the Pacific war - provides perhaps the most striking example of the correct employment of Sigint, and illustrates also the value of Sigint when on the defensive, i.e., in the early stages of a defensive war. With the major part of its heavy units out of action in the Pearl Harbour raid, the U.S. Navy would scarcely have been justified in searching the vast spaces of the Pacific for targets. However, Sigint was able to produce information on both targets and enemy intentions. For example, the U.S. Navy had two months' foreknowledge of Japan's intention to attack Midway Island, and thus were able to build up the air defences of the Island in the interim. The U.S. Navy had full details in advance of the intentions of the Japanese task force, its composition, approach route and current location, and was able to carry out a crushing attack upon it, with both carrier and land based planes, in most cases before the planes of the enemy carriers were airborne.

As a result of this battle, Japanese expansion to the east was stopped, and the balance of power in the Pacific shifted to the United States side. The loss by the enemy of four of their largest aircraft carriers, together with 250 aircraft and some 100 of their first line pilots deprived them of the powerful striking force with which they had achieved their earlier conquests and with which they planned to defeat the U.S. counter-attack.
At the outbreak of the war, Japan possessed about 6,200,000 tons of merchant shipping which was sufficient for her subsistence and immediate military needs. However, the rapid extension of operations and the very nature of island warfare placed severe burdens on this tonnage. The Allied toll of enemy ships increased until sinkings exceeded replacements. Before hostilities ceased in August, 1945, only 1,500,000 tons of Japanese merchant shipping remained and this was practically useless owing to complete Allied control of shipping routes and the closing of the most important Japanese harbours by mines. Deprived of her merchant fleet, Japan had lost the power to wage war.

Sigint played a major role in steering Allied forces on to Japanese shipping targets by providing important information on convoy positions. This was obtained through interception of signals to and from the air cover, and was a result of the growing Allied offensive power with the enemy compelled to provide regular air cover against submarine attack and, when convoys were within striking distance of Allied air bases, against Allied air offensive action.

1. Rabaul Convoys:

Regular convoy positions were first obtained in the closing days of Rabaul's importance as an enemy naval base (early 1944). Protection for convoys coming down from the north was provided mostly from Kavieng, and depending on weather and other factors, the position might be given by either the aircraft reporting the position back to base or the base giving a recent position to an aircraft attempting to locate the convoy.

2. Japan - Singapore Convoys via Manila:

Considerable success was obtained with those convoys particularly during the second half of 1944 when important convoys between Japan and Singapore were routed via Manila and Miri. Air cover was provided primarily against Allied submarines, and at times almost daily positions were obtained between Formosa and Manila and along the Palawan passage.

As this convoy route grew more hazardous for the enemy, it became quite a practice for convoys to shelter for the night (in protected anchorages). The air cover would report back to base "convoy anchored temporarily in .......... Bay, I am returning. 1820". Such reports were most helpful as they gave about 12 hours' margin for the passage of the intelligence. Next morning the air cover reported the convoy's position, course and speed when it took over duty.

3. Malaya Coast Convoys:

When Allied air power was established in the Philippines, the Japan-Singapore convoys were driven to the alternative route via the Indo-China Coast. The same reports from air cover were frequently received and continued till the surrender.
4. **Ormoc Operations - Convoys:**

During the early phases of the Battle of the Philippines, when enemy reinforcements were being rushed to Ormoc (Leyte), much valuable convoy information was obtained. The source was the same - air cover reporting to base the progress of the convoys, particularly in the final dash in and out of Ormoc Bay. 27 naval and merchant ships were destroyed in this operation alone.
TACTICAL AIR INTELLIGENCE AND AIR RAID WARNINGS
IN THE SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA

Throughout the South West Pacific Area, particularly at the various New Guinea and Darwin bases, Sigint provided innumerable air raid warnings and a constant flow of tactical air intelligence. This resulted in successful Allied interceptions, on the one hand, and the destruction of enemy aircraft on the ground, on the other.

Various indications led to these warnings. In the early stages of the war, preliminary enemy weather reconnaissance over Allied territory was a sure indication of a raid to follow, granted suitable weather conditions. In other cases, suspicious bearings on enemy aircraft gave sufficient cause to pass a preliminary warning. A refinement of the procedure was the case of preliminary warnings passed when a known enemy strike frequency was heard "warming up". Although aircraft maintained strict W/T silence base activity alone was sufficient to arouse suspicion.

Frequently it was possible to pass information concerning concentration of enemy air strength at bases within striking range of Allied aircraft. It was the enemy practice to disperse his aircraft at rear bases and stage them to a forward base immediately before a raid. These staging movements sometimes provided several days' warning of impending enemy raids, and often resulted in such raids being forestalled by attacks on their grounded aircraft.

Examples of this procedure are as follows: staging of aircraft from rear bases in the Philippines to the forward base of Koepang (Timor) for attack on Darwin; from rear bases in the Celebes to the forward base of Babo (Dutch New Guinea). Several successful strikes were carried out on Koepang and Babo and anticipated raids thus prevented.

It is emphasised that Sigint was often the only possible source of intelligence on which successful surprise action of this kind could be based, and in the instances mentioned, was the result of intercept work over a distance ranging up to 1,700 miles.
DESTRUCTION OF JAPANESE ARMY AIRFORCE IN NEW GUINEA, 1943

Over a period of about four months in mid-1943, Sigint traced the movement of the Japanese Army Airforce from Japan and rear bases into the airfields of North New Guinea. Full details of types, numbers and the particular airfields of destination were supplied. In a period of three days' raiding by the U.S. Air Force, this large enemy force of nearly 400 planes was virtually annihilated without having been used.

Has been declassified by ASD - 15 April 2021
JAPANESE ARMY ORDER OF BATTLE.

Japanese Army Order of Battle in the South West Pacific had its beginnings in 1942 in the addresses of Army messages being relayed over Naval links. The conversion of the routing information to Naval procedure resulted in a different handling of the address, the Naval system being much simpler than that used by the Army. Valuable cribs into the Army system were thus obtained. From this address intelligence, the first Order of Battle information was obtained, and thus the beginnings of Japanese Order of Battle in the islands north of Australia.

The first successes in the solution of Army main line systems (containing Order of Battle information) were achieved in April 1943, and these were followed in January 1944 by still further successes resulting from the capture of Japanese cryptographic material. For two full months, Japanese messages were read immediately on receipt, and from then till the end of the war, practically everything transmitted was being read with various degrees of currency.

This material yielded Order of Battle information in the fullest detail - units, subordinations, personalities, plans, preparations, etc. It proved of inestimable value to the Allied Intelligence authorities and was of the greatest significance in the planning of the Solomons, New Guinea and Philippines campaigns.
ROLE OF SPECIAL SIGINT UNITS

IN SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA.

On several occasions during the Allied advance, special Sigint Units accompanied the invasion forces aboard the HQ ship. Such special units were employed at the Leyte, Lingayen Gulf, Tarakan and Lebuan landings. Their object was to provide the Task Force Commander with operational intelligence whilst en route to the landing beaches, and once the beach-head had been secured, to set up on shore and continue operations during the advance inland.

An example of this activity is provided by the Special Sigint Unit engaged in the Leyte landing. During the voyage, it was able to report that the convoy had been sighted by enemy aircraft. After the landing, intelligence passed to the Commander included the following:

(a) Air raid warnings.

(b) The location and composition of enemy convoys attempting to reinforce Leyte.

(c) The location of convoys moving along the Indo-Chinn coast.

(d) Enemy sightings of Allied shipping and task forces operating in the area.

(e) Air base activity and movements of enemy aircraft.

(f) Movements of enemy air formations and high ranking officers.

(g) Serviceability reports of enemy airfields.

(h) Enemy weather reports in both target and more remote areas.
BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC

Over considerable periods during 1941-43, the Allies achieved 100% interception and decryption of U-boat communications. This material included orders from the U-boat Command, details of positions, courses, speeds, rendezvous, etc. This enabled the Allies to divert innumerable convoys round the ends of U-boat lines and to achieve "kills" of U-boat tankers and supply boats at critical times. There were periods also when the U-boat Command had access to Allied signals relating to convoy movements through their own naval Sigint Service. Thus the battle often became a race between Allied Sigint on the one hand, giving the location of U-boats, and the consequent diversion of Allied convoys, and German Sigint on the other, giving the location of Allied convoys and consequent orders to U-boats to attack them.
DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY BLOCKADE RUNNERS

Co-operation between Germany and Japan found one of its outlets in a policy of exchange. Germany needed raw materials such as rubber, tin, edible fats, ores, etc., whilst Japan needed essential metals, machinery, scientific instruments, electrical apparatus, blue-prints and know-how. Accordingly, exchange of these was arranged by means of surface blockade runners during 1941-43. Through Sigint, the Allies had detailed information in advance on the ships concerned, their cargo, dates of sailing, ports of departure and destination, etc.. So effective was Allied action based on this information that less than half of the 250,000 tons despatched by Japan reached Germany, and by January, 1944, the blockade runners had been literally driven off the seas. This exchange then went under water, reducing its flow to a mere trickle - only 700 tons being brought to Germany in a period of two years.
ROLE OF SIGINT IN RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN.

In view of the slenderness of the British military forces, and the widely scattered and vulnerable points which might require defence, reliable intelligence of the intentions of the enemy was perhaps never more vital to the continued existence of the British Commonwealth than in the period from Dunkirk to the invasion of Russia. In the course of the first six months of 1941, it was possible to establish from Sigint a general eastward movement of the air and ground forces of the Reich, and to appreciate with increasing certainty that the concentrations which were taking place were to be directed against Russia.

By the end of March, sufficient information was available to suggest that preparations were being made for an attack upon the U.S.S.R. By 31st May, little doubt remained of German intentions, and still later direct references to the crossing of the Russian frontier confirmed the earlier appreciations. A clear three weeks' warning of the coming invasion was thus provided by Sigint at a critical period when the difficulty of obtaining any reliable intelligence of what was about to occur in Europe was very great. Thus, one of the most interesting and most useful episodes in the career of Sigint was that which gave the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, a period of several weeks to consider the policy, which he announced on June 22nd (the day of the attack) that Britain would give "whatever help" she could to Russia.

It may fairly be said that during the whole Russian campaign, Sigint made available to British and to Anglo-American commands information on German plans, operations, capabilities and order of battle on the eastern front unobtainable in any other way.

A valuable by-product of Sigint from the eastern front was the information on Soviet order of battle of ground and air forces derived from German Sigint Service reports. Of all the information furnished by Allied Sigint, however, the messages indicating the transfers of formations to and from the eastern front were of the most immediate importance during the planning for D-Day and from the Normandy landing until the end.
As the Allied landing in Normandy in June 1944 was on a vast scale—probably the most complicated military operation in history—it was vital for the Allied staffs planning that operation to have every reliable scrap of information on what the Germans would and could do. The contribution of Sigint was a complex one in that some information was revealed on almost all of the interrelated aspects of the total Allied picture of the German armed forces and their defensive preparations.

The three most important categories of information furnished by Sigint to Allied planners in early 1944 were: German intentions, German dispositions, and German appreciations of Allied intentions. As the Germans were strategically clearly on the defensive, their intentions were based primarily on their estimates of Allied intentions, and the disposition of their troops was the yardstick showing the practicable limits on what they expected the Allies to do and on what they planned to do themselves. Since the Germans' dispositions and intentions both depended on their concept of Allied plans, the German appreciations are a proper point of departure for an understanding of western front intelligence. These appreciations were also virtually the unique province of Sigint; no other intelligence source provided much information in this category.

As the time of the invasion drew near, the thought processes of the German armed forces were revealed more clearly, and it was constantly evident that the Germans had reached no unanimity in their estimates of the timing and place of the expected landings. Thus, as D-Day approached and it became more difficult for the Allies to change their plans, Sigint made it repeatedly apparent that the Germans did not have any knowledge—at least none on which they were in agreement—which would necessitate a change in those plans. Furthermore, Sigint revealed the particular misconceptions under which the various German military authorities laboured and so aided the Allied cover-plan organization to know which lines of false information the Germans were most ready to believe.

Prior to the Allied break-out from the Normandy beach-head in July, 1944, Sigint had provided the valuable but routine intelligence that was to be expected: the identification and strength of units in the line which had to be smashed, the order of battle of the opposition which would be met after the break-out, and the identity of the reinforcements which might arrive. Following the break-out, Sigint first provided evidence of German intentions to cut off the advanced Allied divisions by attacking through to the sea at Avranches.

According to the Sigint officer with the United States Third Army, the messages concerning the Avranches attacks first demonstrated the value of Sigint at that Head-quarters and led to the custom of holding a Sigint morning briefing for the G.O.C. and certain senior staff officers.

Has been declassified by ASD - 15 April 2021
Later Sigint produced Hitler's repeated refusals to allow withdrawals. These orders led Allied Intelligence to "the realisation that the battle not merely of Normandy but also of France itself was being fought south of the Seine (a remarkable enemy error which simplified an Allied plan made in the previous March)."

These words are taken from the note on the use of Sigint written by Brigadier Williams, Chief Intelligence Officer at Field Marshal Montgomery's Twenty-first Army Group Hq. They constitute one of his "five obvious occasions in the campaign in the west when armies required a clear lead from the Army Group on the enemy's strategy." Later he adds that in all five issues the contribution of Special Intelligence was considerable.

The two advance revelations mentioned above - the first offensive, the latter defensive - illustrate clearly a field in which Sigint is virtually unique: the timely warning of enemy intentions.

At the beginning of September, 1944, the following rough outline was drawn to illustrate the extent and nature of the Sigint available on the first three months of the campaign:

1. German Plans to meet the Invasion.
   (a) von Rundstedt's strategy;
   (b) Rommel's strategy;
   (c) German Air Force strategy.

2. Advance Knowledge of Time and Place of Allied Landings.
   (a) Estimates by C. in C. West;
   (b) Contrary judgments by German Air Force authorities;
   (c) Other estimates;
   (d) Effect on preparations and dispositions.

3. Commitment of German Forces in France
   (a) Dispositions of ground and air forces on D-Day;
   (b) Disorganised and piccanic commitment of divisions during June and July;
   (c) Reasons for unsatisfactory employment of forces;
      (i) Effect of Allied deceptive measures - German fear of further landings;
      (ii) Bad judgment of Allied strength;
      (iii) Effect of Allied and French partisan interference with communications;
      (iv) Vacillating policies of Hitler, C. in C. West and German Air Force authorities.

Has been declassified by ASD - 15 April 2021
4. **Battle Lessons prior to Allied Breakthrough on 25th July 1944**

   (a) Effectiveness of Allied landing techniques;
   (b) Comments on effect of Allied artillery;
   (c) Comments on effect of Allied aircraft;
   (d) Comments on effect of Allied artillery-spotting aircraft;
   (e) German losses and causes thereof.

5. **German Intelligence on Allied Breakthrough from West Normandy after 25th July 1944**

   (a) Success in identifying Allied units in Brittany;
   (b) Success and failure in recognising immediate Allied plans in Brittany;
   (c) Failure to understand overall Allied strategy.

6. **The Battle for Normandy and the Retreat to the Seine.**

   (a) von Kluge's attempts to extricate his forces;
   (b) Hitler's orders compelling German forces to stand and be entrapped.

7. **German Flight across the Seine and through North-West France and Belgium**

   (c) Emergency move of Model to the west;
   (b) Model's lack of awareness of plight of German armies;
   (i) His temporary plans;
   (ii) Reported loss of "defence lines";
   (c) Beginning of German reorganisation and refitting of units.

8. **German Measures against**

   (c) The French partisans;
   (b) Satellite soldiers and foreign legions.

9. **Demolitions and Destruction**

   (a) Ports and fortresses;
   (b) Paris - Hitler's orders.

10. **Manpower Measures**

    (c) New units created for the west;
    (b) Units moved from other theatres;
    (c) Personnel for the West Wall.
CONTRIBUTION OF SIGINT TO ALLIED KNOWLEDGE OF
GERMAN SCIENTIFIC WEAPONS AND APPARATUS

1. Beam Bombing of U.K. Targets

When the German Air Force gave up its
day-light bombing raids on U.K. targets in 1940,
and replaced them with night attacks on London
and provincial towns, it was possible to foretell
the objectives of these night raids with far
greater certainty than with the day raids which
preceded them.

The Germans were using various systems
of navigational beams to guide their aircraft to
the target. The cypher used by the authorities
controlling these beams was relatively easily
broken and the target could be deduced from their
instructions. Other intelligence available
concerned technical information which enabled
effective counter measures to be devised and
successfully put into operation.

2. Radar and Night Fighters

Sigint supplied almost all the facts
known to the Allies on the actual positions of
night-fighter zones. By plotting positions
disclosed in this way, it could be shown that
there was roughly a distance of 30 Kms. between
each Ground Control Interception station or area,
and so the actual boundaries of the sectors could
be estimated. The fact that these boundaries
were known played an important part in the
routing of Allied bombers, for it became apparent
from R/T intercepts that the Germans had difficulty
in deciding which sector should vector a night-
fighter on to bombers which flew along the dividing
line of two sectors.

Sigint was the only source of information
on the organisation for manning the German Ground
Control Interception stations in western Europe.
German Air Force signals regiments manned the
aircraft reporting and radar equipment and passed
plots of incoming British bombers to the fighter
control officer, who in turn gave instructions to
the German night-fighter units. Locations of
these signals regiments were all available from
Sigint, as were the locations and subordination of
nearly all night-fighter units.

In addition to locations, returns of
personnel, aircraft serviceability and conditions
of equipment, Sigint provided knowledge of what
to expect from the German defences. Sigint also
gave a fair estimate of the success of Allied
bombers and how their losses occurred, in the
battle reports from night-fighter units.
In connection with radar apparatus, Sigint provided information on "FREYA", the German search apparatus used for long-distance aircraft warning and coast-watching. It indicated that "FREYA" was used for anti-aircraft firing by night without search-lights, and that German wireless direction equipment included aircraft and fighter direction apparatus.

Sigint provided information also on German radar ships and trains and sufficient material on airborne radar to keep abreast of all developments.

As the radar war increased in intensity, it became more difficult to sort out the new developments as indicated in Sigint because measures caused counter-measures and these still further counter-measures, but on the whole the Germans seemed to be kept on the defensive - they were continually forced to invent new methods of countering Allied jamming.

3. Advance Information on V-Weapons

Sigint on V-Weapons was mainly forthcoming during the experimental period. It made two most important contributions, the first of which was a series of plots taken by radar stations of the German Air Force Signals Experimental Regiment deployed along the Baltic coast and later along the coast of Jutland. These plots enabled a remarkably exact estimate to be made of the probable performance of the flying bomb. The prediction that about forty per cent. would reach the London area was almost exactly fulfilled in the event, and was entirely based on this material, as were the estimates of its range, height and speed. A second contribution consisted of information from signals passing between Peenemuende and Heidelager in Poland, where the principal field trials of the A4 rocket took place. This provided essential information on the technical side of the rocket, as well as the names of all the operational units except one, and the names, though not in many cases, the functions of many of the specialists and officers connected with the rocket's development and operation.

Thus the most notably useful results were those which assisted in the making of accurate estimates of the size and performance of both flying bomb and rocket before either was launched against U.K. If in the case of the flying bomb, the value of this was apparent, in so far as it permitted defensive plans to be made before the emergency arose; in the case of the rocket, against which no defence was possible, it at least helped
to allay the worst and most groundless fears, and
to suggest the difficulties facing German
scientists in bringing the missile to a stage of
development in which it could be used operationally.

4. Development of German Jet Aircraft

As Jet aircraft approached the operational
stage, Sigint proved to be an unrivalled source of
information concerning the characteristics of the
jet types, the type of operations to be undertaken,
the units which were to receive jets, their bases,
their state of training, and the time at which
they were likely to become operational. Since
the jet programme was latterly regarded by the
German Air Force as its final chance to gain air
supremacy from the Allies, it was natural that it
should have been carried out under the highest
possible security conditions, with the result that
ordinary intelligence sources produced little
information. It is also true that, since the
Allied Air Forces recognised in the German jets
the one great threat to their bombing programme,
the success of Sigint in following German
developments was particularly important.

Information on jet propelled aircraft
was supplied by all branches of Sigint. An
unusually large proportion of this information was
obtained from diplomatic traffic, mainly because
of the intense interest of the Japanese in jet
aircraft, and also because the Germans were much
more ready to give the Japanese important
information in the later stages of the war. The
Japanese Naval Attache in Berlin, in particular,
involuntarily supplied Allied Intelligence with
considerable information.
BATTLE OF MATAPAN

Generally speaking, the dispositions and actions of the British Navy in the Mediterranean during the period 1940-43 were based mainly on Sigint.

The Battle of Matapan, in March 1941, was the "first instance, in the Mediterranean Area, of an important operation based on Signal Intelligence". Messages of 17, 21, 25 and 26th March suggested that an operation was being planned to interfere with British convoys in the Eastern Mediterranean and/or Aegean. All relevant indications were transmitted promptly to the Mediterranean Command. The Commander-in-Chief decided first of all to send out his cruisers, then to take the battle squadron and "Fornidable" to sea. C-in-C's signal of 29th March 1941 states that the "information on which the Fleet put to sea came from Sigint sources". The result of the battle was 3 heavy fast cruisers and 2 destroyers sunk, and the battleship "Vittorio Veneto" and possibly others, seriously damaged.
Signal Intelligence, from its interception of German Railway W/T networks in early 1941, and its knowledge of the masses of men and material being transported to the south-east, provided ample evidence of the build up for the Balkans campaign and that Yugoslavia and Greece would shortly be invaded.

Again, Signal Intelligence forecast the invasion of CRETE which followed, and provided detailed foreknowledge of German plans and the date when attack was to take place. All such information was passed currently to CAIRO and to General FREYBERG in CRETE, and a large part of the credit for the annihilation of the initial air-borne landing must be attributed to it. In addition, the sea-borne force which was to support the air-borne landings was successfully located by Signal Intelligence and destroyed by the British Navy.

Mr. Churchill is reported to have stated that Signal Intelligence provided on Crete was worth £10,000,000 to Great Britain.
Sigint provided what was little short of a complete picture of the war in North Africa. Every regiment, often every battalion, was identified with sometimes embarrassing regularity, tanks could be counted almost as accurately by British Intelligence officers as by the G.O.C., German Africa Corps. Fluctuations in the almost always critical supply situation could be so closely observed that the maximum effect was achieved from the sinking of particular merchant vessels and the maximum benefit derived from known German shortages. (Precautionary air reconnaissance was carried out first, security considerations demanding that a strike could not be turned on from Signal Intelligence alone).

German Army Order of Battle and tank strength, German Air Force Order of Battle and operational intentions, supply returns of both Services, shipping movements; these, together with the rarer but scarcely more valuable appreciations and plans at a higher level were the Sigint contributions to the Libyan and Tunisian campaigns.

One of the greatest qualities of Sigint as a source of information was that it enabled the Allies to practise the conservation of effort and the concentration of the maximum effort at the vital spot.

This was amply demonstrated before the Battle of Alamein, by the sinking, in rapid succession, of five fuel-cargoes, the loss of which almost at once immobilised Rommel's tanks because target-selection policy had, for at least two months, been consistently starving the German Army of fuel.

Furthermore, "it can fairly be stated that at no other period during the entire North African campaign did Special Intelligence contribute more decisively to British planning than in the period leading up to the Alamein offensive on 23rd October, 1942. The Sigint available on the enemy supply and transport situation played a very vital role in that contribution". (G.C. &C.S. War History)
ROLE OF SIGINT IN THE CLOSING PHASES OF

GERMANY'S DEFEAT.

It was obviously to the Allies' advantage that Germany should not dissolve into utter chaos. Though it was mid-April, 1945, and the war already won, Germany was still fighting, as Hitler had promised she would. If the surrender of Germany were carried out by a central authority, however, not only would thousands of Allied lives be saved which would otherwise have been lost in the piecemeal reduction of a disintegrated Reich, but also the possibilities of the resurgence after the war of a "Germany never surrendered" myth would be considerably reduced. For the same reason, a central capitulation of the armed forces was desired, and therefore, political and military matters went hand in hand.

In the tangled situation, changing hourly, leading to Germany's collapse, Sigint took on a role which it had played before, but seldom with such immediate importance: that of spying on the thoughts of the German chiefs, matching their intrigues against one another and in general, keeping both Allied commands and Allied cabinets informed of the latest changes in the struggle for power in Germany.
Sigint made a further contribution to Allied Intelligence by confirming beyond all doubt some of the more bizarre and hideous aspects of the Nazi Kultur, especially in occupied countries. The following subjects were covered:

Concentration Camps and Atrocities

Evidence was available of at least 40,000 persons - variously described as "Jews", "Bolshevists", "partisans", etc., having been shot by German Police Units in Russia, and villages liquidated. References were made to "special treatment" for some prisoners in concentration camps.

Establishment of German Settlements and Colonies in Occupied Areas

Abundant information was received on the organisation concerned with settling and moving populations of German origin in eastern and south-eastern Europe. Colonisation was the declared policy of the Nazis - the main object being to establish a vast agricultural territory, populated by German peasants. Settlers followed hard on the heels of the advancing German armies, only to withdraw as refugees before the returning tide of the Russian Army. At the time of the German occupation's greatest extent in 1942, hundreds of thousands of German settlers had been established in Poland, Roumania, Hungary, the Ukraine, the Crimea, and even as far east as the plain north of the Caucasus. The educational, political and economic aspects of this colonisation were well catered for (Nazi style).

Plundering of Cultural Treasures and Germanisation of Occupied Areas

These activities are best illustrated in the case of Poland where exactly the same methods were pursued as in Russia. There was actually a German "Battalion for Special Duties" of the Nazi Party front-line troops whose task it was to loot and plunder the cultural treasures of occupied countries.

German archaeologists had "irrefutably proved" the fact of "German spiritual leadership" in the basin of the Vistula for 1,000 years - thus the Poles had no moral right to it or to its cultural treasures. The situation was taken in hand by the "Institute for German Work in the East" which had sections for pre-history, history, history of art, economics, law, racial studies, geography, agriculture, forestry and gardening, all of which made full use of plundered collections for pseudo-historical and pseudo-scientific propaganda. The Department of Science and Information looked after its interests and indicated beforehand the conclusions to be reached by the use of this abundant evidence. The natural sciences, and scientific equipment, expertly stolen, were turned to more ordinary uses.
Libraries were carried away with the help of forced labourers mobilised by the Police; some of the books were pulped, and some taken away for German use. Books left were re-arranged and the whole collection made German by removing Polish library marks and replacing them with a German stamp, even on old books and manuscripts.

These plunderings were carried out by scholars, scientists and officials of museums employed by the Nazi Government. Their aim was to cut off the Poles from all knowledge of their own history at first hand, and to secure the records and monuments of that history for interpretation according to Nazi conceptions of race and history.